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Abstract
International safety standards state that risk assessment is the ﬁrst step in understanding and eliminating hazardous work environment. The
traditional method of risk assessment using Job Safety Analysis, where sequential tasks of the operator are analysed for potential risks, needs to
be adapted to applications where humans and robots collaborate to complete assembly tasks. This article proposes a novel approach by placing
equal emphasis on various participants working within their workspaces. An industrial case study wil be used to showcase the merits of the
process when used at an early stage in the development of a collaborative assembly cell.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
A safe collaborative assembly cell, where operators and
industrial robots collaborate to complete assembly tasks is
seen as an important technological solution [1,2] for several
reasons including: 1. The ability to adapt to market ﬂuctuations.
[3]. 2. Improve productivity and 3. Improve ergonomic work
environment [4].
Operator safety is an important source of concern for
collaborative assembly as impact with a moving robot can
cause serious injury. According to the International safety
standard, risk assessment is the ﬁrst step in understanding
and eliminating hazardous work environment [5,6]. For
non-collaborative robotic cells, risk assessment were carried
out with the understanding that robots and operators do not
interact. That is, a robots can only be operated in the automatic
mode within a designated workspace and intrusion should result
in a monitored stop of the robot. Physical barriers such as
safety fences were used to ensure operator safety by avoiding
the possibility for collision.
In practice, collaborative robotic assembly system seeks to
remove these barriers to enable closer interactions between
operators and robots, Therefore, risk assessment should
consider both operators and robots as valid participants to
ensure safety of operators and productivity of the assembly
station. With a focus on operator safety, international safety
standards deﬁnes the use of collaborative task only within a
predeﬁned work area called the collaborative workspace [6].
To ensure safety and enable task sharing, safety standards
require that the assembly cell is continuously monitored during
execution of the task. Therefore, the motion of the robot and
the operator within the assembly cell must be monitored using
safety sensors [7]. such as vision system, safety mats, proximity
sensors, etc.
Before safety devices are selected and installed, a systematic
risk assessment will ensure that appropriate devices and
procedures are implemented [8]. Additionally, risk assessment
can also be used to ensure compliance with various regulatory
bodies.
This article presents a work process for risk assessment that
emphasizes on the interactions between the operator, robot and
the work environment (See Fig:1). As collisions are a major
cause of injury and damage [8–10] the article explores the
methodology of Job Safety Analysis to dissect an assembly task
into subtasks and critically analyse subtasks for hazards and
suggest solutions for perceived risks.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the
state of the art that focusses on risk assessment methodologies
of robotic systems and will also detail some of the relevant
robotic and machinery safety standards. Section 3 provides a
generic overview of a collaborative assembly cell in terms of
the participants involved, their tasks within the assembly cell
and the workspace allocated to complete the tasks. Section 2
and 3 forms the basis for the proposed risk assessment process
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which will be described in section 4. Section 5 will brieﬂy
detail an industrial case study where the task is to assemble
a ﬂywheel housing cover. Also, a detailed description of the
application of the assessment process (section 5.1) will show
how the design and safety requirements were acquired through
this process which resulted in a tool for safely hand-guiding an
industrial robot.
Fig. 1: Illustration of the interaction between the three participants of a
collaborative assembly cell within their corresponding workspaces.
2. State Of The Art
Academic literature describes various methods to conduct
risk analysis for robotic systems which can be broadly
described as quantitative and qualitative. Dhillon & Fashandi
[9] and Etherton [8,10] has outlined a few of the commonly
used risk analysis methods for robotic systems though Dhillon
& Fashandi focuses on Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure
Mode and Eﬀect Analysis (FMEA) as relevant methods in their
article. Etherton refers to Job Safety Analysis for conducting
risk assessment in application areas where operator tasks have
to be considered.
The quantitative Fault-Tree Analysis require probabilistic
information about occurrence of failure, which can then be
used to calculate a combination of fault-events that could lead
to a robot related accident. The qualitative Failure Mode
and Eﬀect analysis is used to understand and document all
possible failures (and its eﬀects) so that corrective actions can
be suggested to mitigate the sources of failure. FMEA uses a
tabular form to document each failure mode and its eﬀect along
with the probability of failure and possible solution.
Compared to Job Safety Analysis (JSA), FMEA and FTA
are higher ﬁdelity analysis methods as the basic requirement
for their usage is that information of possible risk must
be known beforehand. Therefore, for the development of
new collaborative assembly cells, these methods are not
immediately applicable, though they are widely used when
information of the risks are known or can be better estimated.
In addition, these methods do not consider task that has to be
performed and therefore Job Safety Analysis [8,10] is a better
choice to conduct risk assessment. Job Safety Analysis aims
to break down an assembly task into subtasks. The procedure
is to analyse the subtasks for hazards and suggest methods or
procedure to reduce or nullify the eﬀects of these hazards.
Industrial machinery and their use within a manufacturing
plant are required to adhere to safety standards. Collaborative
assembly brings forth additional risks that arise when
operators and robots have to work together. Risk assessment
methodologies should allow for the possibility of arriving at
solutions that meets the requirement of safety standards, some
of which are:
1. General machinery such as end eﬀectors, external
actuation, power delivery are expected to follow the
Machinery standard – SS-ISO 12100:2010 – Safety
of Machinery – General principles of Design – Risk
assessment and risk reduction (ISO 12100:2010) [5].
The standard deﬁnes and lists out the requirements and
procedure to conduct risk assessment.
2. Industrial robot safety design are governed by part
one of SS-ISO 10218-1:2011 – Robots and robotic
devices – Safety requirements for industrial robots –
Part 1: Robots[6]. This standard focusses on safety
requirements of manipulators and therefore is targeted
at robot manufacturers whereas part two of Robots and
robotic devices – Safety requirements for industrial robots
– Part 2: Robot systems and integration is focussed on
robotic system integrators [11] .
3. The newly released ISO/TS 15066 Robots and robotic
devices – Collaborative robots [12] speciﬁes requirements
for collaborative industrial robot systems and the work
environment. This Technical speciﬁcation is intended to
act as supplement to the Industrial robot safety standards.
3. Collaborative Assembly Cell
In this section, a collaborative assembly cell will be
characterized in terms of the tasks that will be performed, the
participants that are responsible for the tasks and the workspace
to complete the task. The main purpose of describing an
assembly cell in terms of tasks and participants is to map the
interactions between them (See Figure: 1).
3.1. Workspace in a Collaborative Cell
International safety standards suggest the following
workspaces for a collaborative assembly cell [6,13]:
1. Robot Workspace: Within the robot workspace, an
industrial robot can be programmed to move in automatic
mode at rated speed and must stop if the there is an
intrusion. Traditionally, the robot workspace is closed
oﬀ from external interaction using physical fences or
safeguards [6].
2. Operator Workspace: The area assigned to the operator
to do his task can be termed as operator workspace and can
be monitored for safety with corresponding reduction of
speed if the operator goes near the robot and complete stop
if the operator is close to the robot to warrant a complete
stop.
3. Collaborative Workspace: The collaborative workspace
allows the robot and the operator to work together,
which means that the robot and operator share a common
workspace. The nature of assembly task is described in
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Section: 3.2. Though the robot can be moved in automatic
mode within the collaborative workspace, the speed of the
robot is limited [12]. Also, there must be Human-machine
interfaces (HMI) to signal to the operator that the robot
can be tasked in collaborative mode.
3.2. Assembly Task in a Collaborative Assembly Cell
Collaborative assembly refers to the possibility of
completing assembly tasks by an operator and a robot
together. The nature of these tasks were summarized by Kru¨ger
et al. [3] in terms of task allocation in the assembly process
as well as in terms of time that is shared to complete the task.
In other words, Kru¨ger’s demarcation refers to the degree of
collaborative work. The safety standards [6,11] suggest the
following application areas for collaborative robots which can
include one or more of the following: 1. Safety-rated monitored
stop. 2. Hand guiding. 3. Speed and separation monitoring and
4. Power and force limiting by design or control.
3.3. Participants in a Collaborative Assembly Cell
In a collaborative assembly cell, there are three distinct
participants.
1. Industrial robotic System: Industrial robotic system
as recognized by the safety standards include the
manipulator, end-eﬀector and external sensor system that
are designed to work cohesively. These separate parts
must conform to the corresponding safety requirements
and must be designed to work safely with operators during
the collaborative mode.
2. Operator: An operator is the trained personnel expected
to share the robotic cell but can also include other
personnel present in the vicinity. They are also expected
to be take responsibility of an assembly cell and shut down
the assembly system in case of emergency.
3. Working environment: The working environment should
also meet the standards for robotic safety as external
interferences can lead to injury or production delay. The
working environment includes equipment located near to
the assembly cell that can interfere with the intended
functionality of the robotic cell.
4. Job Safety Analysis for Collaborative Assembly Cell
Risk analysis can be used to drive the design of the robotic
system that is safe for the operator and ensure a productive
assembly cell. Therefore, it has to be understood as an iterative
process which begins when the basic functionality [14] of the
assembly cell is established i.e., cell layout to carry out the
assembly task is deﬁned. The proposed work process that
emphasis the interactions between the participants and their
tasks can be described as follows:
Step 1: The assembly function of the production cell can be
reformulated into discrete and sequential subtasks. The
subtasks are allocated to the participants who will perform
them within an allocated workspace. That is, the ﬁrst step
is to divide the assembly task into subtasks and establish
participants and workspaces for each subtasks.
Step 2: Job Safety Analysis require that the subtasks are
critically analysed for hazards. In the second step, the
objective is to analyse the subtasks allocated to each of the
participant. To estimate all possible hazards, each subtask
associated with a participant can be critically analysed by
focusing the analysis on the interaction of the participant
with the other set of participants. For example, if T1 is
a subtask to be performed by an operator, the analysis
should capture the interaction of T1 has on the robot as
well as the Working Environment.
Step 3: In the ﬁnal step, the causal factor for each of the
hazard can be documented along with the eﬀect of the
risk. Information on the causal risk along with the
eﬀects can be used to suggest solutions to mitigate the
risks. Probable solutions can be in form of assembly cell
monitoring solutions, safety by design, guidelines from
safety standards etc., which can then be used to specify
design requirements for the robotic system.
5. Case Study: Hand-guided assembly of heavy parts
The assembly task is to install a ﬂywheel housing cover on
the ﬂywheel housing. Currently, the operator has to secure the
ﬂywheel housing cover on a lifting device and then manually
push it to the correct location where two pins are used to guide
the cover onto the housing. Then the assembly are fastened
using bolts that are tightened by the operator using a hand-held
device.
In the proposed collaborative assembly cell, the robot is
a lifting device that can be programmed to select the correct
housing cover and present it to the operator. The responsibility
of the operator is therefore reduced to precisely locating the
cover onto the ﬂywheel housing. The robot can be programmed
to push the housing cover with a predeﬁned force thereby
reducing the assembly task to installing and tightening the bolts.
Fig. 2: Illustration of a conceptual model of a collaborative assembly cell. The
operator is responsible for guiding the robot to the correct location. The robot
is used as a ﬂexible lifting device [4].
5.1. Risk Assessment of a Collaborative Cell
To elaborate the process of risk assessment presented in
Section:4, the case study described above will be used to
illustrate the basic idea of the proposed work process.
The ﬁrst step is to divide the task of installing the ﬂywheel
housing cover into discrete subtasks which are allocated to
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the participants. The subtasks are: 1. Robot moves from
home position to programmed point to pick up the ﬂywheel
housing cover (RT). 2. Robot activates the end-eﬀector to
clamp the cover (RT). 3. Robot moves to take over point in
the collaborative workspace (RT). 4. Operator moves towards
the robot in the collaborative workspace (OT). 5. Operator
will move the robot (Hand Guiding) towards the assembly
point (CT). 6. Operator will position the cover on the ﬂy
wheel housing (CT). 7. Operator will activate the release
of the ﬂywheel housing cover from the end eﬀector (CT).
8. Operator engages the robot to move to the home position
(RT). 9. Operator will fasten bolts (OT).
RT, OT and CT correspond to the robot, operator and
collaborative tasks respectively. In the next step of the risk
assessment process, each subtask needs to be critically analysed
to eliminate hazard and in the ﬁnal step the causal factors and
possible solution to mitigate the risks needs to be documented.
To illustrate how the risk assessment process have been used
to develop safety and design requirements for the assembly
cell, consider Task 4 where there is a possibility of collision of
robot and operator. A possible solution is to develop monitoring
systems that can stop the robot if an intrusion is detected. To
mitigate the risk of production delays a visual indicator can be
used to warn the operator that the robot is not in collaborative
mode and it is not okay to enter the working zone.
The green visual indicator shown in Fig:3 (Left)
communicates to the operator that the robot is ready for
collaboration and disables the monitoring system. During
hand-guiding of the robot (Task 5), it is important that
the operator is safe while undertaking the task. There is
a possibility for injury to the operator’s hand during robot
motion. A solution is to ensure that both the hands are engaged
to move the robot. Fig:3 is a two handed guiding tool with two
three-position enabling device ergonomically placed behind
the handle that ensures both hands are used to move the
robot. Annex C of Safety Standard ISO 10218-1 [6] details the
functional and safety requirement of the three-position enabling
device while Annex D of Safety Standard ISO 10218-2 [11]
details the truth values when two enabling devices have to be
used together. Additionally, an emergency stop button (The
large red button) have also been implemented as suggested in
the safety standard (Section 5.5.3.3. of ISO/TS 15066:2016
[12] )
Fig. 3: A concept for a hand-guiding device that can used to move the ﬂywheel
housing cover (left) into position. A switch that increases the accuracy of robot
motion to enable precise assembly (Right Top). The yellow indicator light
conveys to the operator that the guiding pins are engaged and that the cover
can be released. (Right Bottom).
In order to maintain good quality by ensuring accurate
installation of the ﬂywheel housing cover (Task 6), the risk
assessment suggested an additional button (Fig:3 Right Top) to
enable precise movement of the robot. This has the possibility
to maintain production quality as it was noticed that, though
hand-guiding improve assembly ﬂexibility, it is diﬃcult to
accurately position the locating pins over the mating holes. For
the majority of hand guiding motion, precise movement is not
required and is only required once the pins are close enough
and then the operator needs to engage precision movement to
accurately locate the pins into the mating holes.
The light indicator shown in Fig:3 (Right Bottom) were
incorporated to communicate to the operator that Task 7 can
be executed i.e., it indicates that the both the pins are secured
and it is safe to release the ﬂywheel cover from the end eﬀector.
Safe design of the end eﬀector will be dictated by safety of
machinery standards [5] along with other relevant standards that
govern electrical systems, ergonomic standards etc.
6. Conclusion
The overall goal of undertaking a risk assessment is to
document all possible hazards and suggest methods to curtail
them. Hazards arise from various sources such as malfunction
of equipment, unexpected collision etc. It is possible to avoid
them through safety-focused design and establishing work
procedure that circumvent probable risks.
It is not impossible to accidentally fail to foresee a hazard, as
a collaborative assembly cell represents a complex interactions
between operators and machines. A structured approach to
estimating risk is required that will allow the risk assessor to
foresee potential hazards. To aid in this eﬀort of identifying
hazards, an assembly cell has been characterized as workspaces
for participants to complete tasks. As shown in the article, such
a characterization places equal emphasis on the participants that
allows for mapping of the interactions between them and their
work environment, thereby facilitating a focused analysis of
hazards and solutions to eliminate them. The assembly tasks
for each participant were documented and analysed using Job
Safety Analysis Method for risk mitigation.
Safety standards suggest that risk assessment is to be done
in cooperation with the user. Within an assembly line, the users
can be the operators, line managers or other experts who might
be familiar with the technical risks and may or may not have the
knowledge or experience to suggest proactive measures to avoid
potential hazards. For example, a robotic system specialist will
have the required knowledge to suggest design requirements for
end eﬀectors but may not have the required expertise to suggest
layout of vision sensors that can be used for safe monitoring of
the assembly cell. Therefore, the risk assessment process must
facilitate inputs from experts as well as users.
It can be argued that collaborative robotic systems are more
exposed, due to the absence of physical fences, which opens up
more venue for accidents. Therefore, it becomes imperative
to undertake design decisions with a focus on safety. It
was shown that risk assessment when undertaken at an early
stage of development, not only enables facilitation of safety
requirements that meets regulatory safety standards but also
requirements that ensures production quality.
To conclude, the risk assessment proposed in this article
is aimed at an early stage of development of a collaborative
assembly cell. The work process aims to act as a way to ensure
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that appropriate devices and procedures are implemented from
the beginning so that knowledge can be gained about the
robotic system. Then, it becomes possible to use higher ﬁdelity
analysis methods to assess risks resulting in the development of
a safe and productive collaborative assembly station.
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